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1 Introduction
Separation of ownership and management allows rms to commit to behavior other than
prot-maximization. Certain empirical evidence implies that they do not behave as prot-
maximizers. For example, Amihud and Kamin (1979) supported Baumol (1958)s hypoth-
esis that revenue-maximizing behavior is more prevalent among oligopolistic, management-
controlled rms. From a managerial-incentive perspective, Vickers (1985) and Fershtman
and Judd (1987) theoretically justied this empirical evidence. Vickers (1985) established
that rms may obtain higher prots by delegating to managers who do not behave as
prot-maximizers. Fershtman and Judd (1987) examined the incentives that owners of
competing rms in an oligopoly give managers as compensation, inducing the managers
to maximize linear combinations of the objectives of prots and sales. They showed that
owners of duopolistic rms always incentivize sales more as compared to prot. These
works have motivated a large amount of research concerning strategic delegation1.
Brander and Lewis (1986) theoretically considered the relationships between an oligopolis-
tic product market and nancial structure, and showed that limited liability may induce a
leveraged rm to a more aggressive output stance2. As in the case of strategic delegation,
there are also many works concerning nancial structure3.
An oligopolist is assumed to be a limited liability company in previous nancial struc-
ture literature, and a prot-maximizer. The existing literature is also limited by focusing
only on a symmetric equilibrium in that all rms in the oligopoly have a homogeneous
1See Sengul, Gimeno, and Dial (2012) for a recent survey of the works on strategic delegation in the
economics and management literature.
2Etro (2010) characterized the optimal nancial structure as a strategic device to optimize the value
of a rm competing in a market for which entry is endogenous, and showed the general optimality of
moderate debt nancing under both quantity competition and price competition in an oligopoly with
cost uncertainty.
3See Ne¤ (2003) for related literature.
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organizational structure.
In the real world, however multiple rms with heterogeneous organizational structures
and strategies compete in a duopoly under risk. As a real example of oligopoly, we
would mention the competition between the Mitsui Gomei Kaisya and Suzuki & Co.
from the late Meiji era to Taisho era (18871911, 19121926)4. These two rms are
the genesis of Japanese sogoshosha (general trading company) as substantial unlimited
partnership rms5. The intense competition in the global trading business between Suzuki
and Mitsui in the rst half of the Taisho era is well-known6. Roberts (1973) mentions
that Baron Mitsui Hachiroemon, the president of Mitsui Gomei Kaisya, had delegated
daily managerial decision-making to his general sta¤ (managers)7. According to Katsura
(1975), Suzuki & Co. took exclusive charge of the over-all administration and investment
decision-making of Suzukis subsidiaries, and thus did not delegate decision-making at
these subsidiaries to their managers8.
In this paper, we therefore examine whether an owner delegates its tasks, decisions,
4We thank Daniel Spulber for suggesting that we should search and present an original real example
for our study by introducing us to his seminal book, Famous Fables in Economicson an earlier version
of this paper.
5Katsura (1975) mentions that in 1909, Mitsui established the Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui Gomei Kaisya),
an unlimited partnership and holding company with the Mitsui Bussan as one of its subsidiaries. Suzuki
was incorporated into an unlimited partnership, Suzuki & Co. (Gomei Suzuki). According to Roberts
(1973, p. 172), in 1909 (Baron Takashi) Masuda organized a holding company, called Mitsui Gomei
Kaisya, to supplant the outdated partnership as supreme headquarters of the business empire. ... The
initial capital of Gomei Kaisya was fty million yen, all of it invested by the eleven Mitsui houses, whose
heads remained its sole owners.
6Katsura (1975, p. 41) mentions, In short period, Suzuki joined Mitsui Bussan as one of the only
two Japanese trading companies that could trade on such a large scale that they were forced to rely
not only upon the Specic Bank of Yokohama but also upon London merchant bankers in their foreign
exchange dealings.
7Specically, Roberts (1973, p. 172) states, Baron Mitsui Hachiroemon Takamine was president of
Gomei Kaisha but, as usual, business a¤airs were managed by general sta¤, among whom Masuda, Dan
Takuma, and Ikeda Seihin another Harvard graduate were most powerful.
8See Katsura (1975, p. 43). Roberts (1973) also mentions, Kaneko (who is an actual president of
Suzuki & Co.) had secured a controlling interest in the Sixty-fth Bank in Kobe ... Because of his mania
for keeping absolute control of the company in the hands of the Suzuki family, he had resisted opening
the concerns enterprises to public subscription, which would have invited invasion by zaibatsus.
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and responsibility to a manager a¤ects the equilibrium outcome and welfare in a Cournot
duopoly with demand uncertainty. To derive a clear result and to ensure an asymmetric
equilibrium, we modify the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Brander and
Lewis (1986) as follows. Fershtman and Judd (1987) assumed that a rms managerial
incentive chosen by its owner represents a linear combination of its sales and its prots
and showed that owners of duopolistic rms always give incentives sales more than prot.
We, however, assume that this incentive is either its sales or its prots instead. That is, we
consider the situation in which a rms managerial incentive is its sales (its prots) when
the owner delegates (does not delegate) its tasks to its manager. While this assumption
is certainly restrictive, it allows us to generate an equilibrium with asymmetric behaviors
of rms, that is, one rm chooses delegation while another selects no delegation in the
equilibrium, and is supported by empirical evidence in McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962)
and Amihud and Kamin (1979). While Brander and Lewis (1986) assumed that a rm
nances a xed start-up or project cost, we assume that it nances to pay for variable
production costs, following Povel and Raith (2004). Cleary et al. (2007) empirically
supported this assumption by Povel and Raith (2004), which makes our model tractable.
We consider a two-stage duopoly game with demand uncertainty. In the rst stage,
shareholders of each rm simultaneously choose the mode of delegation by designing an
incentive scheme for the manager of their rm, either no strategic delegation (prot-
maximization) or strategic delegation (sales-maximization). Of course, this seems to
be too strong an assumption since incentive schemes for the manager taking into con-
sideration components other than the prot or sales of each rm, are also considered
theoretically, and data on these cannot be observed by economists in a real economy9.
The prots or sales of companies are often open to public, via nancial statements in
capitalist nations. As such, we might be able to verify the theoretical model by empirical
9Robert Porter pointed this out in an earlier version of his paper.
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analysis10. In the second stage, the manager of each rm simultaneously chooses her
output quantity after she observes the objective of her rival rm. That is, in the second-
stage game, following the BranderLewis framework, we rst consider three types of à
la Cournot duopolies with demand uncertainty: one composed of rms with no strategic
delegation, one composed of rms with strategic delegation, and one mixed-delegation-
type duopoly in which a no delegation rm and a delegation rm coexist. We derive
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. We show that both rms choose delegation
when the demand is su¢ ciently large but they choose di¤erent modes of delegation (one
rm chooses no delegation and the other chooses delegation) when the demand is small
in the equilibrium of the game. By comparing the equilibria of subgames, we characterize
the equilibrium outputs, prices, and total outputs in these equilibria.
Furthermore, we dene the expected social welfare in equilibria and compare its level
under the three subgame equilibria previously derived. Using the demand, we characterize
which of the three subgame equilibria would be desirable from a social welfare perspective.
We nd that a delegation duopoly equilibrium is most desirable from a social welfare
perspective for any value of the demand parameter in the whole game. However, it can
be attained when potential demand is su¢ ciently large but it cannot be attained as an
equilibrium when the demand is small.
In the next section, we describe the structure of our model. In section 3, we consider a
10These analytical frameworks seem to be supported by McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962). They
present the average correlation coe¢ cients for executive compensation and sales and for executive com-
pensation and prots from the data on revenues, prots, and compensation for 45 enterprises from 1953
to 1959; they then show that the former is larger than the latter and that the signicance of the t
values for the former is consistently higher than those for the latter. Harimaya, Ohkawa, Okamura, and
Shinkai (2012) focus on oligopolistic behavior in the domestic loan market and examine the intensity
with which managers attempt to maximize sales and prots using data for Japanese regional banks for
FY1980FY2009. We nd that sales-maximization explains the behavior of Japanese regional banks
more adequately and appropriately than prot-maximization. In particular, yearly uctuations in the
degree of managerial objectives suggest that the e¤ort to maximize sales has intensied after full-scale
liberalization of interest rates.
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Cournot duopoly subgame comprising two rms with no strategic delegation and derive an
equilibrium of this subgame. Then, we derive a Cournot equilibrium in a duopoly subgame
comprising two rms with strategic delegation. We derive a Cournot equilibrium in a
mixed-type duopoly subgame comprising a rm without strategic delegation and another
with strategic delegation. Furthermore, we consider the rst stage, in which each rm
chooses the mode of delegation (its objective) either strategic delegation or no strategic
delegation and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game by combining
it with the three two-stage Cournot duopoly subgames. We develop a two-stage duopoly
game in which each rm chooses the mode of delegation: either no strategic delegation
or strategic delegation in the rst stage and then à la Cournot competition in the second
stage. In section 4, we evaluate the equilibrium of the whole game from a social welfare
perspective. The nal section contains our conclusion.
2 The Model
We consider a duopoly model in which two indebted rms produce a homogeneous good
with an identical constant marginal cost. There exists additive demand uncertainty. The
objective of each rm is to maximize the expected prot or sales, based on their choice.
They delegate their decision of the rms output to a manager; however, they control the
manager by designing incentives to attain their objective: prot- or sales-maximization.
Fershtman and Judd (1987) assumed that the manager of rm i in an oligopolistic
market is given an incentive to maximize ii+(1 i)Ri, where i and Ri are the prot
and revenue of rm i, respectively, and i is the weight assigned to the prot of the man-
agers incentive. They showed that the shareholders of each rm always incentivize sales
more than prot (i.e., a small i < 1) for their manager at the equilibrium under some
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conditions. Vickers (1985) also presented an example in which shareholders strategically
adjust their managers incentive di¤erent from prot-maximizing11.
We thus restrict our attention to two polar cases i = 0 (sales maximization) and
i = 1 (prot maximization) because the prot and sales of each rm are observable
(known) to the other rm12. The shareholders can ask for debt Di (i = 1; 2) from outside
investors if the equity capital is not su¢ cient to nance production. According to Brander
and Lewis (1986), the debt holders are residual claimants in case of bankruptcy. In this
paper, we consider the strategic delegation e¤ect on duopolistic competition and its market
outcome.
Suppose that each rm can choose its mode of strategic delegation strategic delega-
tion (sales-maximization) and no strategic delegation (prot-maximization) in the rst
stage. Then, given the mode of delegations, two rms compete à la Cournot in the second
stage.
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear with an additive uncertainty:
p = a+ ez  Q = a+ ez   (q1 + q2); (1)
where a(> 3) denotes the magnitude of the market and ez is a uniformly distributed
random variable with support [ z; z] (where a   z > 0) and with probability density
11Vickers (1985) assumed that the manager of oligopolistic rm i maximizes Mi = i + iqi, where
i, qi, and i are prot, quantity of output, and a strategic parameter variable on the incentive for the
manager of rm i.
12Suppose that we set i = c or i = 0 in the objective of rm is manager function with constant
returns-to-scale technology. Mi is given by i + iqi = (p(Q)  (c  i)) qi.
Then ,Vickers (1985)s example reduces to the cases i = 0 (sales-maximization) and i = 1 (prot-
maximization), respectively.
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function
(z) =
1
2z
; for z 2 [ z; z]; (2)
= 0; otherwise.
From (2), we observe that ez has mean 0 and variance 1
3
z2. We also assume that rm
i (= 1; 2) has a linear cost function
Ci(qi) = cqi; a > c > 0.
We normalize c = 1. Here, we make a key assumption in our analysis of leveraged
rms under limited liability. That is, we assume that rms are nancially constrained and
must nance all or part of their variable costs by borrowing from their investors or banks,
following Povel and Raith (2004). Most of the debt contract literature assumes that a rm
or an entrepreneur must nance a xed start-up or project cost, as Brander and Lewis
(1986) assumed in their paper. In these papers, the equilibrium output and the equilib-
rium debt level of each rm are not derived explicitly on account of the nonlinearity of the
reaction function of each rm as described in the analysis of the BranderLewis frame-
work13. Povel and Raith (2004), however, have considered a Cournot duopoly in which
one of the rms is nancially constrained and must nance all or part of its variable costs
by borrowing from investors and in which another rm is not nancially constrained14.
13In the BranderLewis framework, Ri (the gross prot function) is assumed to depend on outputs qi,
qj and random shock ezi with support [ z; z]. A threshold value of realization z of ezi, bzi, is also assumed
such that the rm is bankrupt for zi < bzi and that equity holders are residual claimants only in the good
state of nature (zi  bzi). Then, the value of bzi depends not only on the debt level of Bi, but also on qi
and qj . Therefore, the reaction function of a rm with respect to qi becomes a nonlinear function of qi.
For example, see Franck and Pape (2008).
14As Povel and Raith (2004) stated in their paper, internal fundsdenotes the rms own funds that
it can use to pay for variable production costs, w0  r0   F , where r0 and F denote the rms retained
earnings and xed costs, respectively. Cleary et al. (2007) show that w0 < 0, that is, negative internal
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Under their assumption, the choice of output of each rm uniquely determines its level
of debt, thus making our analysis more tractable. We thus assume that the debt level of
each rm is a linear cost function of the rms output under limited liability. We take
the debt assumed by the rm as endogenous. The rm takes on debt only to nance its
production:
Di = Ci(qi) = cqi = qi.
The prot of rm i(= 1; 2) is dened as
i(qi; qj; ez) = Ri(qi; qj; ez) +Di   Ci(qi)  r = (a+ ez   qi   qj)qi   r. (3)
When rm i(= 1; 2) chooses its mode of strategic delegation strategic delegation
(sales-maximization) it maximizes the expected total net revenue that includes its debt
revenue from investors (bankers) dened as
Rtneti (qi; qj)  Eez[Ri(qi; qj; ez)] = Ri(qi; qj; ez) +Di   r = (a+ ez   qi   qj + 1)qi   r. (4)
The repayment function is dened by
r = (1 + )Di = (1 + )Ci(qi) = (1 + )qi, if   z  z < z; (5)
where  > 0 is an interest rate that banks(investors) charge to every rm and assume
that it is exogenously given constant in this study.
From (5), the expected prot of rm i, the expected value of prot with respect to ez,
is given by (3), that is,
funds, are empirically relevant using 20 years of annual Compustat data, and as such, we can expect that
a rm must nance variable costs in such cases. Hence, we think that the role of a risky debt contract
on product rivalry in a duopoly under assumptions made in Povel and Raith (2004) merits investigation.
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i(qi; qj) = Eez Ui (qi; qj; ez) = Z z
 z
(Ri(qi; qj; z)  Ci(qi) +Di   r)(z)dz
=
Z z
 z
(a+ z   qi   qj   (1 + ))qi(z)dz. (6)
We assume the following to guarantee a positive margin for the rms in an equilibrium.
[Assumption 1] a > 3 +  :
3 Two-stage Game under Unlimited Liability
We rst derive the second-stage duopoly game in which rms choose the mode of dele-
gation, either no delegation (prot-maximization) or delegation (sales-maximization), in
the rst stage, and then compete à la Cournot in the second stage.
We now consider the second-stage game. Given that each rm chooses no delegation
as its mode of delegation, we have an equilibrium in the Cournot duopoly game.
From (6) in section 2, the rst-order condition is given by
a  2qNi   qNj   1   = 0; i; j = 1; 2; (7)
where superscript N denotes that the mode of delegation for each rm is no delegation.
From (7), (1), (1), and (3), we can easily obtain each rms output, total output, and
expected price, the rmsexpected prots, the expected producer surplus, the expected
consumer, and the expected social surplus at the equilibrium. These are summarized in
Table 1.
Next, given that each rm chooses delegation as its mode of delegation, a simple
calculation gives us the Cournot equilibrium. Each rm i maximizes its expected net
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revenue from (4) and (5):
Rtneti (qi; qj) = max
qi
Eez[(a+ ez   qDi   qDj + 1)qDi   r]
= max
qi
f(a+ ez   qDi   qDj   )qDi g,
where superscript D denotes that the mode of delegation for each rm is delegation.
The rst-order condition is
a  2qDi   qDj    = 0; i; j = 1; 2. (8)
From (8), (1), and (3), we can easily obtain each rms output, the total output,
the expected price, the rmsexpected prots, the expected producer surplus, the ex-
pected consumer surplus, and the expected social surplus at the equilibrium. These are
summarized in Table 1.15
Finally, we examine themixed-delegation Cournot duopoly, in which one rm (say, rm
1) adopts no delegation (prot-maximization) while the other (say, rm 2) adopts delega-
tion (sales-maximization). We use the superscript ND to denote the variables associated
with the Cournot duopoly in which rm 1 adopts No delegation (prot-maximization)
while the other (say, rm 2) adopts Delegation.
Setting i = 1; j = 2 in (7) and i = 2; j = 1 in (8) yields
a  2qND1   qND2   1   = 0;
a  2qND2   qND1    = 0; (9)
where superscriptND shows that the mode of delegation of rm 1 (rm 2) isNo delegation
15To guarantee a positive expected prot in the UD equilibrium, we assume that a > 3.
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(Delegation).
From (9), (1), and (3), we can easily obtain each rms output, the total output,
the expected price, and the rmsexpected prots at the ND equilibrium. These are
summarized in Table 1.
Note that a  > 3 guarantees the existence of the mixed-delegation equilibrium. We
can easily show the following proposition from Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a    > 3. Then, we have qND2 > qDi > qNi > qND1 ,
QD > QND > QN , and EpD < EpND < EpN . If a    4, then END2 > ENi  EDi 
END1 . If 3 < a   < 4, then END2 > ENi > END1 > EDi ; i = 1; 2.
The intuition underlying this proposition is clear. The delegation (sales-maximizer)
rm in the D equilibrium produces more aggressively than the no delegation (prot-
maximizer) rm in theN equilibrium because the former acts without considering its cost.
This result intrinsically corresponds to the result presented in Fershtman and Judd (1987).
In the ND mixed-delegation type duopoly equilibrium, in addition to no consideration
on cost, the strategic substitute property in Cournot competition makes the delegation
(sales-maximizer) rm 2 act more aggressively, and accordingly, the no delegation (prot-
maximizer) rm 1 reacts by shrinking its output as compared to in the N equilibrium.
The last inequality result of the above proposition explains why Suzuki & Co. (no
delegation (prot-maximizer) rm) never delegated managerial decisions when its rival
Mitsui Gomei Kaisya (delegation (sales-maximizer) rm) had done so: the potential
demand in the market was not large enough in the ND mixed-delegation type duopoly
equilibrium. If Suzuki & Co. had delegated, then its expected prot would have shrunk.
4 Welfare Analysis
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In this section, we conduct equilibrium welfare analysis of the subgames. The expected
social surplus is the sum of the net expected producer surplus, the expected surplus of
the banks (investors), and the expected consumer surplus.
The net expected producer surplus in the k (=N;D;M , where M = NDorDN)
equilibrium is expressed as
EPSk =
Z z
 z
PSk(Qk; z)(z)dz =
1
2z
Z z
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1  )Qkdz. (10)
The expected prot of banks (investors) in the k equilibrium is given by
EBP k =
1
2z
Z z
 z
((1 + )Qk  Qk)dz = Qk; k = N;D and M(ND or DN): (11)
From the above equation and Proposition 1, we see that EBPD > EBPM > EBPN =
2
3
(a 1 ) > 0, since a 1 > a 3 >  from Assumption 1. Hence, there exists   such
that 0 <   < a 3 and a positive expected prot for banks (investors) in the equilibrium
is ensured.
The expected consumerssurplus in the k equilibrium is
ECSk =
Z z
 z
CSk(Qk; z)(z)dz =
1
2z
Z z
 z
1
2
(Qk)2dz =
1
2
(Qk)2. (12)
We dene the expected social surplus in the k equilibrium as
ESSk = EPSk + EBP k + ECSk. (13)
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Substituting (10), (11), and (12) into (13) and rearranging, we get
ESSk =
1
2z
Z z
 z
(a+ z  Qk   1)Qkdz + 1
2
(Qk)2
= (a Qk   1)Qk + 1
2
(Qk)2 = (a  1
2
Qk   1)Qk  F (Qk): (14)
That is, the expected social surplus in the k equilibrium is expressed by a concave
quadratic function of the total output of each equilibrium.
F has a maximum at Q = a  1. Then, we have
F 0(Qk) R 0; if Qk Q Q = a  1. (15)
Because E[pk  1] = E[a+ z  1 Qk] = a  1 Qk = Q Qk > 0, Q > Qk holds from
Proposition 1.
The expected producer surplus, the expected consumer, and the expected social sur-
plus at each equilibrium are summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
From Table 1, we can easily derive the following proposition. (The proof is omitted.)
We consider the rst-stage game summarized in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Note that EDN2 = E
ND
1 and E
DN
1 = E
ND
2 . From Proposition 1and Table 2, we
obtain the following propositions.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that a     4. Then, the equilibrium mode of delegation
is (D;D). Suppose that 3 < a    < 4. Then, the equilibrium mode is mixed: either
(D;N) or (N;D).
We compare the expected social welfare at the three equilibria derived above, and
evaluate the equilibrium of the whole game from a social welfare perspective.
Proposition 3 ESSD > ESSM > ESSN , where M = (NDorDN).
Proof: From (15) and Proposition 1, We see that ESSk = F ((Qk)) and F 0(Qk) > 0
for Q = a  1 > Qk; k = N , D and M(DN or ND), and that Q = a  1 > QD >
QND > QN . Hence the result follows.Q.E.D.
The delegation duopoly is most desirable and realized as an equilibrium in the two-
stage game for large demand (a  4).
That is, the equilibrium in this case achieves the second best. On the other hand,
with low demand, the resulting equilibrium fails to attain the second best.
Note that the mixed-delegation equilibrium ((D;N) or (N;D)) appears when the
demand is small. Neither the lack of consideration on cost nor the strategic substitute
property under Cournot competition makes the delegation (sales-maximizer) rm 2 act
more aggressively, and accordingly, the no delegation (prot-maximizer) rm 1 reacts
by greatly shrinking its output since the residual demand after deducting the expanding
output of the delegation rm 2 becomes small and rm 1 must choose less aggressively
mode, no delegation. Thus, the mixed-delegation equilibrium may be attained at least
when the potential demand is small. However, the owners of rm 1 choose delegation
instead of no delegation if the potential demand is large enough, if they expect that
residual demand after deduction of the expanding output of the delegation rm 2 is
su¢ ciently low, and if the delegation equilibrium (D;D) may be attained.
15
From the result derived in this section, note that themixed-delegation duopoly prevails
as an equilibrium when the demand is small, but the delegation duopoly prevails when
this demand becomes large. Thus, managerial incentives more weighed to prots may
prevail when potential demand is small and e¢ cient delegation duopoly is not always
seen in the equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we consider a duopoly with additive demand uncertainty in which there
are two rms producing and supplying a homogeneous good with an identical constant
returns-to-scale technology. We consider no delegation and delegation, two opposite types
of incentive contracts, one of which attaches great importance to prot and another places
less emphasis on prot but more on sales. First, we derive a two-stage duopoly game
in which shareholders of each rm choose the mode of delegation, either no delegation
(prot-maximization) or delegation (sales-maximization), in the rst stage and then com-
pete à la Cournot in the second stage. By deriving a subgame perfect equilibrium in this
two-stage game, we show that the mixed-delegation duopoly arises as a subgame per-
fect equilibrium when potential demand is small and the delegation duopoly arises as an
equilibrium when potential demand is large. Furthermore, we show that the delegation
duopoly is always the most e¢ cient from a social welfare perspective.
From the results of the two-stage game in Proposition 1, we present a rational il-
lustration why Suzuki & Co. (no delegation (prot-maximizer) rm) never delegated
managerial decision-making even when rival Mitsui Gomei Kaisya (delegation (sales-
maximizer) rm) did so: the potential demand in the market was not large enough
in the mixed-delegation type duopoly equilibrium in Taisho Japan. Thus, if Suzuki were
16
to managerially delegate, its expected prot would have likely decreased.
In the paper, we consider the e¤ect of strategic delegation on equilibrium outcome
and welfare only in a Cournot duopoly with a strategic substitute model structure. The
result on welfare, of course holds only for the scenario in which the moral hazard problem
never exists, as is the case for this work. In the real business world, lenders (banks) take
precautions to ensure that their money is not squandered or put at unnecessary risk by
those who have borrowed it, because there exists the moral hazard problem of borrowers.
That is, they monitor what they lend by examining the rms nancial condition and
credit history and by placing restrictions on how their funds may be used. Our analysis
ignores this moral hazard problem and thus also ignores such monitoring activities of
investors. The results of this welfare analysis may di¤er if the analysis considers the
moral hazard problem.
Accordingly, many issues remain. The rst issue to address is the extension of our
analysis to an oligopoly setting. The second one to address is our analysis under limited
liability and comparison of it with the result of this analysis. Furthermore, as Etro (2012)
emphasized in his paper, it is important to consider the relationship between strategic
delegation and limited liability in price competition with strategic complementarity. This
issue is left for future research.
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Table 1 Subgame Equilibrium
N equilibrium ND equilibrium D equilibrium
qNi =
1
3 (a  ) qND1 = 13 (a     2) < qND2 = 13 (a+ 1  ) qDi = 13 (a     1)
QN = 23 (a     1) EQND = 13 (2(a  )  1) QD = 23 (a  )
EpN = 13 (a+ 2(1 + )) Ep
ND = 13 (a+ 2 + 1) Ep
D = 13 (a+ 2)
ENi =
1
9 (a     1)2 END1 = 19 (a     2)2 EDi = 19 (a  )
< END2 =
1
9 (a     2)(a+ 1  ) (a     3)
EPSN = 29 (a     1)2 EPSND = 19 (a     2) EPSD = 29 (a  )
(2(a  )  1) (a     3)
ECSN = 29 (a     1)2 ECSND = 118 (2(a  )  1)2 ECSD = 29 (a  )2
ESSN = 49 (a     1)2 ESSND = 118 (2(a  )  1) ESSD = 29 (a  )
(4(a  )  5) (2(a  )  3)
E denotes the expected value of PS, CS, and SS denote producerssurplus,
consumerssurplus, and social surplus in each equilibrium, respectively.
Table 2 First-stage game
Firm 1nFirm 2 N D
N EUN1 ; E
UN
2 E
UND
1 ; E
UND
2
D EUDN1 ; E
UDN
2 E
UD
1 ; E
UD
2
N and D denote no delegation and delegation, respectively.
1
